ECON 7050: Advanced Economic Theory
Fall 2011
Instructor: Professor Yongmin Chen
Office: Econ 112
Class Time: 1:30-2:45 MW
Class Room: ECON 119
E-mail: Yongmin.Chen@colorado.edu
http://spot.colorado.edu/~cheny/
Office Hours: 3:00-5:00 p.m. on Wednesday
Course Description: This is the third graduate course in microeconomic theory. It contains several important topics that were not covered in the two previous microeconomic theory courses. It will also discuss additional topics of interest.
Course Materials: The textbook is Microeconomic Theory, by Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green. Other reading materials, including articles, are indicated below or will be added during the semester.
Grading: Grades are based on homework and class participation (10%), a modeling exercise (20%), and two exams (70%). You are encouraged to form study groups to discuss homework and lecture materials. In the modeling exercise, you will be asked to develop a simple model to describe and analyze a microeconomic problem.
Lecture Topics: Below is a tentative plan for the lectures. Changes will be announced in class during the semester and you are responsible for updating the information.
Topic 1 Dynamic Models
of Imperfect Competition and Entry
Problem Set 1: 12.C.18, 12 D.2., 12 E.4., 12 E.7, 12G.1.
Topic 2 Adverse Selection, Signaling, and Screening
Problem Set 2: 13.B.2, 13.B.4, 13.C.1, 13.C.5.
Topic 3 The
Principal-Agent Problem
Problem Set 3: 14.B.4, 14.C.3, 14.C.7, 14.C.8.
Modeling Exercise: Develop
a simple model to describe and analyze a microeconomic problem. I will discuss the requirements in class.
Exam 1.
Topic 4 Theory of the Firm
Topic 5 Vertical Contracting
1. The Problem of Vertical Control
2. Resale Price Maintenance (RPM)
3. Contracts as a Barrier to Entry
4. Naked Exclusion
5. Recent Developments
Rquired Readings:
· Aghion, Philippe and Patrick Bolton, "Contracts as a Barrier to Entry," AER, 77(3), 1987.
·
Chen, Yongmin, “Oligopoly Price Discrimination
and Resale Price Maintenance,”
· Rasmusen, Eric, J. Mark Ramseyer, and John Wiley, "Naked Exclusion," AER, 1991.
·
Segal, Ilya and Michael Whinston,
"Exclusive Contracts and the Protection of Investments,"
Other
· Chen, Yongmin and David Sappington, “Exclusive Contracts, Innovation, and Welfare,” American Economic Journals: Microeconomics, Vol. 3, 194-220, 2011.
· Fumagalli, Chiara and Massimo Motta, "Exclusive Dealing and Entry when Buyers Compete," AER, 96(3), 2006.
· Greenlee, Patrick, David Reitman, and David Sibley, "An Antitrust Analysis of Bundled Loyalty Discounts," International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2008.
· Segal, Ilya and Michael Whinston, "Naked Exclusion: Comment," AER, 2000.
·
Spier, Kathryn and Michael Whinston, "On
the Efficiency of Privately Stipulated Damages for Breach of Contract: Entry
Barriers, Reliance and Renegotiation,"
· Simpson, John and Abraham Wickelgren, "Naked Exclusion, Efficient Breach, and Downstream Competition," AER, 2007.
· Wright, Julian, “Exclusive Dealing and Entry, When Buyers Compete: Comment,” AER, 2009, p. 1070-81.
Topic 6 Economics of Search
1. Price Search in Homogeneous Product markets
(1) Salop and Stiglitz’s “Bargains and Ripoffs”
(2) Varian’s model of sales
(2) Diamond’s Paradox
(3) Stahl’s model of sequential search
2. Product Search in Differentiated Markets and on the Internet
(1) Wolinsky’s model
(2) Order of Search
(3) Paid Placement: Advertising and Search on the Internet
Required
· Diamond, Peter. 1971. "A Model of Price Adjustment." Journal of Economic Theory, 3, 156-168.
· Salop, S. and J. Stiglitz, “Bargains and Ripoffs: A Model of Monopolistically Competitive Price Dispersion”, RES (1977), pp. 493-510.
· Stahl, Dale O. 1989. "Oligopolistic Pricing with Sequential Consumer Search." AER, 700-712.
· Varian, Hal. 1980. "A Model of Sales." American Economic Review, 70, 651-659
· Wolinsky, A. 1986. “True Monopolistic Competition as a Result of Imperfect Competition,” QJE, 101” 493-511.
·
Armstrong, M, Vickers, J, and Zhou, J., “Prominence and Consumer Search”,
Other
· Armstrong, M. and Y. Chen, “Inattentive Consumers and Product Quality,” Journal of the European Economic Association, (2009), pp. 411-422.
· Bagwell, K. and G. Ramey, “Coordination Economies, Advertising, and Search Behavior in Retail Markets”, AER (1994), 498-517.
· Bester, H., “Bargaining, Search Costs and Equilibrium Price Distributions”, RES (1988), 201-214.
· Chen, Y. and C. He, “Paid Placement: Advertising and Search on the Internet,” Economic Journal, 2011 (in press).
· Chen, Y. and T. Zhang, “Equilibrium Price Dispersion with Heterogeneous Searchers,” International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2011 (in press).
· Reinganum, J., “A simple Model of Equilibrium Price Dispersion”, JPE (1979), pp. 851-858.
· Grossman and Shapiro, “Informative Advertising with differentiated products”, RES, 1984, 63-81.
·
Chen, Y. and R. Rosenthal, “On the Use of
Ceiling-price Commitments by Monopolists”,
· Baye, Michael and John Morgan. 2001. "Information Gatekeepers on the Internet and the Competitiveness of Homogeneous Product Markets." AER, 91, 454-474.
·
Baye, M.R. and J. Morgan. 2004. "Price
Dispersion in the Lab and on the Internet: Theory and Evidence."
· Burdett, Kenneth and Kenneth L. Judd. 1983. "Equilibrium Price Dispersion." Econometrica, 51, 955-969.
· Janssen, Maarten C. and Jose Luis Moraga-Gonzalez. 2004. "Strategic Pricing, Consumer Search and the Number of Firms." Review of Economics Studies, 71, 1089-1118.
· Reinganum, Jennifer F. 1979. "A simple Model of Equilibrium Price Distribution." Journal of Political Economy, 87, 851-858.
Exam 2
Completing Modeling Exercise.
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